Watching China Watching (XXIX)
China Heritage launched the series Watching China Watching in early 2018 by quoting the observations of László Ladány and Simon Leys on reading the Chinese Communist press. Among other things, Simon Leys remarked that:
Communist Chinese politics are a lugubrious merry-go-round … and in order to appreciate fully the déjà-vu quality of its latest convolutions, you would need to have watched it revolved for half a century. The main problem with many of our politicians and pundits is that their memories are too short, thus forever preventing them from putting events and personalities in a true historical perspective.
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The latest contribution to Watching China Watching introduces and translates ‘Three Critiques of Inflatuation’ 人民網三評浮誇自大文風, a series of essays on writing style and media hyperbole published by People’s Daily in early July 2018. It also adds to our ongoing work on New Sinology 後漢學, that is an approach that takes seriously Official China while guiding students of China to find abiding elements of cultural value beneath the Communist farrago.
— Geremie R. Barmé
Editor, China Heritage
10 July 2018
Note:
- In keeping with the in-house style of China Heritage, the following editorial essays and introduction employ full-form Chinese characters. The bilingual translations of the three People’s Daily essays reproduce the original texts in simplified characters.
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Contents
- A Lesson in New Sinology
- The Three Winds
- Taking the Air
- The Wind
- Mendacious, Hyperbolic, Fatuous
- Three Critiques of Inflatuation
- People’s Daily Preface to the Three Critiques
- I: Don’t You Know How to Write?
- II: Do the Chinese Lack Self-confidence?
- III: Style is Anything but Trivial
A Lesson in New Sinology
In China Heritage we celebrate the vital aspects of the Chinese tradition both by introducing readers to Nouvelle Chinoiserie 奇趣漢學, as well as by adding to our long-term advocacy of New Sinology 後漢學, which we first articulated in 2005. Previously we have illustrated this way of appreciating contemporary China in the context of the tradition in the series New Sinology Jottings 後漢學劄記.
What’s useful about New Sinology? As we have remarked previously:
Today’s corporatised education system too often leaves students of China well versed in the professions, but unable to understand with ease and fluency the wellsprings of what China is today. Deprived of the broader linguistic and cultural context, they are ill-equipped to understand, translate or engage with such daily essentials as online discussions, coded commentaries or sometimes even newspaper headlines, let alone the myriad traditional concepts used by Chinese thinkers, politicians, economists and strategists in articulating China’s sense of itself and its new place in the world. …
New Sinology advocates an approach to contemporary China that appreciates the overculture of the dominant Chinese Communist Party and what, through ideology, its policies, the mass media, the education system and its internal and global propaganda efforts the Party promotes as Official China. It also inducts those engaged with China into the particularities of Translated China, that is the versions of China advocated by the Party authorities through their selective approach to and interpretation of the Chinese world, be it in the contemporary context or that of the tradition or the twentieth century.
The ‘Lesson in New Sinology’ presented here begins with a discussion of the ‘Three Winds’ 三風 that formed the core of the Communist Party Rectification Movement in Yan’an in 1942-1943, which was called a ‘campaign to correct the direction of the prevailing wind [in the Party up to that time]’ 整風運動. We then extend our understanding of the role of that crucial campaign to contemporary Chinese politics by noting the use and significance of the word fēng 風 ‘wind’, ‘air’ before going on to offer an outline review of the ‘winds’ fēng 風 that have shaped the Chinese landscape since 1949. Only then do we introduce the ‘Three Critiques of Infatuation’ published by People’s Daily.
Today, the Xi Jinping-era version of The China Story claims to be the sole legitimate way to understand China, both present and past. Many writers, journalists and academics, be they inside China or overseas, strain to hear, report, create stories or translate the polyphony of voices, the jostling of ideas, aspirations and the melding of the traditional with the contemporary that can inform an engaged yet independent appreciation of the Chinese world unencumbered by Communist Party dogma. It is the task of Party organs like People’s Daily, however, to corral a Chinese multiverse that is constantly threatening to break out of the prison of words. Through our advocacy of New Sinology we hope to aid and abet people to appreciate better the limits of that party-prison.
The People’s Daily Three Critiques contain various literary references, quotations from important traditional and modern works, and the use of historical analogy. These may well be overlooked by the careless reader or dismissed as mere affectation, nothing more than a crude effort by hack writers to appeal to sanctified tradition, a kind of pedantic footnoting or a phony display of ill-digested scholarship. However, for those familiar with modern Chinese prose more generally, such devices are par for the course. They are not necessarily a lazy quotational version of a Sinitic Reader’s Digest. This kind of literary-historical-intellectual 文史哲 usage adds both literary validation and strength to expository prose. To dismiss this practice, or to fail to appreciate the broader cultural ambience it reflects — one far beyond the limited purview of the Communists — is to overlook an essential part of Chinese cultural expression.
The Three Critiques translated in full below employ a range of neologisms, stock Party formulations and acceptable clichés. Here, however, we will point out only a few of the more obvious cultural and historical references, most of which would be familiar to the average interested reader. Our short glossary of terms, names and ideas takes the form of a series of ‘New Sinology Notes’ appended to the three essays. For, although the prose style of official Party writing is verbose, grammatically ungainly and syntactically tortuous, authors frequently enhance their work by employing flourishes of erudition, or by drawing on Chinese and international literature, history and thought. For students of contemporary China, even the most deathly writing may offer cultural leads that can enrich and enliven an understanding of China’s cultural multiverse. These notes are offered then for non-Chinese readers as an outline guide to how they might expand their understanding of the Chinese world beyond the earthbound pull of contemporary culture and ideas into an empyreal realm of abiding value. In the past, looking up references in Party prose required painstaking work in libraries and dictionaries, as well as a reliance on memory; today, fortunately, for most readers ‘research’ generally relies on little more an online search engine.
— The Editor
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Further Reading:
Homo Xinensis
- The Editor and Lee Yee 李怡, Deathwatch for a Chairman, China Heritage, 17 July 2018
- The Editor and Others, Drop Your Pants! The Party Wants to Patriotise You All Over Again (Part I) — Ruling The Rivers & Mountains, China Heritage, 8 August 2018
- The Editor and Others, The Party Empire — Drop Your Pants! The Party Wants to Patriotise You All Over Again (Part II), China Heritage, 17 August 2018
- The Editor and Others, Homo Xinensis — Drop Your Pants! The Party Wants to Patriotise You All Over Again (Part III), China Heritage, 31 August 2018
- Geremie R. Barmé, A People’s Banana Republic, China Heritage, 5 September 2018, also published as Peak Xi Jinping?, ChinaFile, 4 September 2018
- The Editor and Others, Homo Xinensis Ascendant — Drop Your Pants! The Party Wants to Patriotise You All Over Again (Part IV), China Heritage, 16 September 2018
- The Editor and Others, Homo Xinensis Militant — Drop Your Pants! The Party Wants to Patriotise You All Over Again (Part V), China Heritage, 1 October 2018

The Three Winds
With the dawn of the Xi Jinping Epoch, one characterised by increased official secrecy, the policing of errant opinion, the closing down of diverse sources of information and commentary, and the general one-man-rule style of hegemonic discourse, some of the old techniques may well require dusting off. Similarly, with Xi Thought 習近平思想 now enshrined in the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, it is not surprising that, as in other areas, China’s Chairman of Everything and his think-tankers have delved into Party history, not only for inspiration, but also to re-engineer techniques that have over time proved to be well suited to compliance and thought manipulation.
Among other things, they draw on the lessons of the late 1930s and early 1940s when Mao Zedong, having achieved ascendancy over his rivals launched what was known as a mass campaign to ‘Rectify the Three Winds’ 整頓三風 of the Party. The Three Winds or ‘styles of doing things’ were: The Wind of the Party 黨風, The Wind of Study Methods 學風 and The Wind of Writing 文風. The movement — which included the study, recitation and internalisation of a corpus of approved political texts along with a punishing schedule of meetings and constant confessions — was aimed at the elimination of enemies (both ideologically and, in some cases, physically), but more importantly, and in contrast to the Moscow Trials of Stalin’s Soviet Union (1936-1938), to impose in thought, word and deed a strict adherence to the precepts of Mao’s Sinicised brand of Stalinism-Marxism-Leninsm. The process would require Party members not only to acknowledge verbally the dominion of the new dogma 口服 but also to embrace it in the depths of their hearts 心服.
Overseen by Mao, his ideological vizier Kang Sheng 康生 and Liu Shaoqi 劉少奇 (an ardent supporter who, in early 1945, would formally articulate the theory of Mao Zedong Thought 毛澤東思想) and others, the Rectification Movement was launched in early 1942. Party members — a motley collective of individuals from a range of backgrounds and regions — were required first to study in exacting detail selected texts, analyze, discuss and repeat core tenets of the evolving Party dogma; then they had to open themselves up to rounds of confessions and ideological renewal (distastefully called ‘dropping your pants to cut off your [bourgeois] tail’ 脫褲子, 割尾巴).
The Rectification Movement forged a new unity among the Communists at a time of ideological contestation and wartime disruption. It was an ideologically unified political party with a disciplined and coordinated armed force that would lay the basis for the one-party state after 1949. The Yan’an Rectification prepared the way both for the early achievements (purges, pogroms and mass murders) of the Mao era, as well as the national disasters of High Maoism, in particular the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution from 1957 to 1977. (For more on the origins of the rectification, see our five-part series ‘Drop Your Pants!’)
The Yan’an Rectification 整風 was of historical importance, it was also the first of three ‘wind corrections’: the second was launched in mid 1950, shortly after the founding of the People’s Republic. It was aimed at reorienting the Party to effectively rule China; it entailed rounds of self-criticism among Party members to fine hone their political awareness and an anti-corruption campaign. The third, and most devastating ‘rectification’ was launched in 1957, following the Hundred Flowers Campaign that had led to widespread criticism of the Party (see ‘New Sinology Note 1’ appended to the third essay from People’s Daily below). China’s intellectual and cultural life have never recovered from the ‘correction’ of 1957, nor has it been disavowed by the Communist Party.
Today, eighty years later, Xi Jinping and his propagandists recall the achievements of 1942-1943 approvingly as Party members are required to undergo a similar Personal Renovation 自我革命. (The Yan’an Spirit 延安精神 has loomed large from before Xi’s rise to power and, since his accession as party-state-army leader in 2013, his apparat has been assiduous in imposing practices perfected in the old wartime base. These include collective study sessions aimed at training participants to parrot the Party line verbatim, ideological reporting — and snitching, as well as pro forma confessions and rounds of liturgical criticism-and-self-criticism).
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In the opening salvos of the Rectification Movement launched in Yan’an in February 1942, Mao Zedong said that they had to confront the problems the Communist Party had with ‘The Three Winds’ 三風 for there was:
Something wrong with our style of study, with our style in the Party’s internal and external relations and with our style of writing. 我們的學風還有些不正的地方,我們的黨風還有些不正的地方,我們的文風也有些不正的地方。
In dedicated speeches he addressed each of these ‘winds’ in turn:
- Reform our Study, 改造我們的學習;
- Rectify the Party’s Style of Work, 整頓黨的作風; and
- Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing, 反對黨八股.
Here we are concerned with the term wénfēng 文風, the focus of the three People’s Daily opinion pieces that appeared in early July 2018. Wénfēng 文風 or ‘style of writing’ (which Mao used to attack ‘stereotyped writing’, that is, the theoretical writings of his factional enemies) connotes ‘the way of expressing oneself in a written form’, or simply ‘rhetorical style’ (the common word for ‘rhetoric’ in modern Chinese is xiūcí 修辭). As we have pointed out elsewhere, Chinese politics imbues many words with a powerful ‘moral-evaluative’ dimension (see On New China Newspeak). Thus, wénfēng 文風 doesn’t simply mean ‘style’, it also describes the manner in which an author express something unique about themselves fēnggé 風格 while revealing to the reader both their social demeanor and moral persona zuòfēng 作風.
The opinion pieces translated below from People’s Daily focus on the question of Literary or Writing Style 文風 and how it both reflects the mood of the nation and has an impact on the political and social mores of the country. In particular the opinion pieces discuss fúkuā zìdà wénfēng 浮誇自大文風 which we translate as ‘Hyperbolic and Boastful Style’. It could just as easily be rendered in terms of superlativism, overkill or exaggeration. It means, in short, ‘rhetorical gigantomania’. But, before proceeding to the opinions of People’s Daily, we will say a few words about fēng 風, ‘wind’ or ‘air’ itself, and review some of the compounds and expressions in which it is generally used.
Taking the Air
Fēng 風 has from the earliest times denoted ‘popular temper’, ‘sensibility’, and even style or manner. The Book of Songs 詩經, an anthology of 305 poems supposedly selected by Confucius himself, is one of the Six Classics 六經 of the Confucian canon. It is what the scholar C.H. Wang calls ‘the fountainhead of Chinese literature’. The folk songs in the ‘Airs of the State’ 國風 in the Book of Songs were collected from various regions of predynastic China. For the most part, they celebrate daily life as well as reflecting the temper of the times. Since then, the concept of social mores, popular sensibility, styles of expression as well morality itself has often been expressed by the word fēng 風. ‘Observing the winds’ 觀風 or ‘collecting the wind’ 採風, that is, noting the contents of popular ballads, was one way that power-holders gauged popular opinion. Ill winds 歪風 (also 歪風邪氣) represent dangers to the health both of the individual and of the state. For millennia assiduous officials and literary figures attempted to understand what such fēng 風 might truly signify; all too often, they would jump to conclusions about the nature of popular sentiment, and as a result they might be derided for foolishly ‘pouncing on the wind and grasping at shadows’ 撲風捉影.
Fēng 風 notably features in the term fengshui 風水, and ‘wind and light’ 風光 (also 風景, ‘windy scene’) means ‘scenery’. It features as wind in globally recognised traditional Chinese medicine and it appears in words and expressions related to risk 風險 and hardship 風雨. Prevailing winds determine how one might ‘secure a strategic advantage’ 佔上風, or graciously concede defeat 甘拜下風. The word features too in terms related to rapid change or transformation, such as ‘trend’ 風潮, ‘the flavour of the month’ 風靡一時, and in the expression ‘with lightning speed’ 風馳電掣.
Fēng 風 appears too in terms to do with ingrained social behaviour, customs and practices. For instance, the Communist Party’s tireless efforts ‘to remake and improve social mores’ is called 移風易俗 (literally, ‘move winds and change habits’), while those same authorities decry all that is deemed to ‘undermine [Party approved social] practices and morality’ 敗俗傷風.
Fēng 風 similarly occurs in the words for ‘social ambience’ 風氣, ‘customs and habits’ 風俗習慣 and ‘positive public behaviour’ 新風, as well as in the word for ‘fashion’ 風尚, roughly ‘the dominant wind’.
Fēng 風 too denotes the movement of news and information, and it is found in the compound word for ‘hearsay’ or ‘rumour’ 風傳, as well as in the phrase ‘to response with alacrity what has been heard on the wind or rumoured’ 聞風而動. ‘Waters whipped up into a frenzied wave’ 風潮 connotes turbulence or a political maelstrom. Whereas fēng 風 is used for ‘ventilate’ or ‘to let air in’ 透風, it is also similarly employed when talking about ‘letting air out’, as in ‘leaking information’ 走漏風聲. It is a term that can also denote the witty or humorous style of an individual, 風趣.
A model citizen or person worthy of emulation 風範 is the embodiment of disciplined behaviour and good morals 風紀, their example may even provide a model for others 風世. The word ‘elegance’ 風采 usually connotes class and refinement but, from 1986, it took on a more militant dimension when it was featured in the song ‘Bloodstained Glory’ 血染的風采. Among other things, the song was sung to commemorate the ‘Party martyrs’ — that is the heavily armed PLA soldiers — who were killed during the Beijing Massacre of 4 June 1989. The popular People’s Liberation Army hymn was famously sung by the singer-soldier Peng Liyuan 彭麗媛, later China’s First Lady.
In early 2016, when discussing Party guidance concerning the media, the Chairman himself introduced a new ‘four-character fixed expression’ 成語, that is: 成風化人. It means ‘to engineer a positive social and moral ambience 風氣 through public information and the news media, and thereby educate and enlighten 教化 the individual [so that they can internalise Core Socialist Values]’. The formulation appears repeatedly in the People’s Daily critiques below.
Fēng 風 is similarly used in relation to individual character and integrity where it can mean demeanor 風度, style (literary or personal) 風格, and even the steeliness of one’s manner (or calligraphic flair) 風骨. The use of fēng 風 is not limited to positive expressions, since it appears too in expressions that describe political opportunists and fence-sitters 風派人物, that is those people who observe which was the wind is blowing 觀風 and trim their sails to the prevailing wind 望風轉舵. Some winds are reckless and violent — the foul-tempered and murderous Li Kui 李逵 in the classical novel Water Margin 水滸傳 was known as ‘Black Whirlwind’ 黑旋風 (now also the brandname of an insect repellent) — but, from early in the tradition, writers have equally extolled the ‘Hero Wind’ 雄風 (see the rhapsody by Song Yu below), an afflatus that is possessed by rare individuals. Heroic heroic figures are lauded for being ‘at one with the winds and currents [of destiny]’ 風流人物.
Mao Zedong used the expression 風流人物 in his most celebrated ci-lyric poem Snow 雪 which he had published in the wartime capital of Chungking at the time of the Yan’an Rectification Movement. To many readers not in the thrall of Mao’s unfolding personality cult at the time it revealed unseemly personal, if not imperial, ambition:
For truly great men, 數風流人物,
look to this age alone 還看今朝。
— see Watching China Watching (XII)

The Wind
風賦
Song Yu
宋玉
Translated by Burton Watson
Song Yu (c.290-c.223 BCE) served at the court of the State of Chu and was a disciple of the famous poet-statesman Qu Yuan. … The poem may be intended simply to delight the reader with its gusty portrait of the two winds of the land of Chu. But if commentators are to be believed, a more serious purpose underlies it, the expression of veiled reproaches against a king whose way of life is so far removed from that of his impoverished subjects that the very winds that blow upon them are of a different nature.
— Burton Watson
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King Xiang of Chu was taking his ease in the Palace of the Orchid Terrace, with his courtiers Song Yu and Jing Cha attending him, when a sudden gust of wind came sweeping in. The king, opening wide the collar of his robe and facing into it, said, 楚襄王游於蘭台之宮,宋玉景差侍。有風颯然而至,王乃披襟而當之,曰:
How delightful this wind is! And I and the common people may share it together, may we not? 快哉此風。寡人所與庶人共者邪。
But Song Yu replied, 宋玉對曰:
This wind is for Your Majesty alone. How could the common people have a share in it? 獨大王之風耳,庶人安得而共之。
‘The wind,’ said the king, ‘is the breath of heaven and earth. Into every corner it unfolds and reaches; without choosing between high or low, exalted or humble, it touches everywhere. What do you mean when you say that this wind is for me alone?’ 王曰:夫風者,天地之氣,溥暢而至,不擇貴賤高下而加焉。今子獨以為寡人之風,豈有說乎。
Song Yu replied, 宋玉對曰:
I have heard my teacher say that the twisted branches of the lemon tree invite the birds to nest, and hollows and cracks summon the wind. But the breath of the wind differs with the place which it seeks out. 臣聞於師:枳句來巢,空穴來風。其所托者然,則風氣殊焉。
‘Tell me,’ said the king. ‘Where does the wind come from?’ 王曰:夫風始安生哉。
Song Yu answered: 宋玉對曰:
The wind is born from the land
And springs up in the tips of the green duckweed.
It insinuates itself into the valleys
And rages in the canyon mouth,
Skirts the corners of Mount Tai
And dances beneath the pines and cedars.
Swiftly it flies, whistling and wailing;
Fiercely it splutters its anger.
It crashes with a voice like thunder,
Whirls and tumbles in confusion,
Shaking rocks, striking trees,
Blasting the tangled forest.
Then, when its force is almost spent,
It wavers and disperses,
Thrusting into crevices and rattling door latches.
Clean and clear,
It scatters and rolls away.
Thus it is that this cool, fresh hero wind,
Leaping and bounding up and down,
Climbs over the high wall
And enters deep into palace halls.
With a puff of breath it shakes the leaves and flowers,
Wanders among the cassia and pepper trees,
Or soars over the swift waters.
It buffets the mallow flower,
Sweeps the angelica, touches the spikenard,
Glides over the sweet lichens and lights on willow shoots,
Rambling over the hills
And their scattered host of fragrant flowers.
After this, it wanders into the courtyard,
Ascends the jade hall in the north,
Clambers over gauze curtains,
Passes through the inner apartments,
And so becomes Your Majesty’s wind.
When this wind blows on a man,
At once he feels a chill run through him,
And he sighs at its cool freshness.
Clear and gentle,
It cures sickness, dispels drunkenness,
Sharpens the eyes and ears,
Relaxes the body and brings benefit to men.
夫風生於地,
起於青蘋之末。
侵淫溪谷,
盛怒於土囊之口。
緣太山之阿,
舞於松柏之下,
飄忽淜滂,
激颺熛怒。
耾耾雷聲,
回穴錯迕。
蹶石伐木,
梢殺林莽。
至其將衰也,
被麗披離,
衝孔動楗,
眴煥粲爛,
離散轉移。
故其清涼雄風,
則飄舉升降。
乘凌高城,
入於深宮。
抵華葉而振氣,
徘徊於桂椒之間,
翱翔於激水之上。
將擊芙蓉之精。
獵蕙草,離秦衡,
概新夷,被荑楊,
回穴衝陵,
蕭條眾芳。
然後徜徉中庭,
北上玉堂,
躋於羅幢,
經於洞房,
乃得為大王之風也。
故其風中人狀,
直慘淒惏栗,
清涼增欷。
清清泠泠,
愈病析酲,
發明耳目,
寧體便人。
This is what is called the hero wind of Your Majesty.
此所謂大王之雄風也。‘How well you have described it!’ exclaimed the king. ‘But now may I hear about the wind of the common people?’ 王曰:善哉論事。夫庶人之風,豈可聞乎。
And Song Yu replied: 宋玉對曰:
The wind of the common people
Comes whirling from the lanes and alleys,
Poking in the rubbish, stirring up the dust,
Fretting and worrying its way along.
It creeps into holes and knocks on doors,
Scatters sand, blows ashes about,
Muddles in dirt and tosses up bits of filth.
It sidles through hovel windows
And slips into cottage rooms.
When this wind blows on a man,
At once he feels confused and downcast.
Pounded by heat, smothered in dampness,
His heart grows sick and heavy,
And he falls ill and breaks out in a fever.
Where it brushes his lips, sores appear;
It strikes his eyes with blindness.
He stammers and cries out,
Not knowing if he is dead or alive.
夫庶人之風,
塕然起於窮巷之間,
堀堁揚塵,
勃郁煩冤,
衝孔襲門。
動沙堁,吹死灰,
駭溷濁,揚腐餘,
邪薄入甕牖,
至於室廬。
故其風中人狀,
直憞溷郁邑,
毆溫致濕,
中心慘怛,
生病造熱。
中唇為胗,
得目為篾,
啖齰嗽獲,
死生不卒。
This is what is called the lowly wind of the common people.
此所謂庶人之雌風也。
***
Source:
- John Minford and Joseph M. Lau, Classical Chinese Literature: An Anthology of Translations, Volume I: From Antiquity to the Tang Dynasty, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, pp.270-272. The original Chinese text has been added.

Mendacious, Hyperbolic, Fatuous
假、大、空
Constant exaggeration is always bound to lead to ever greater exaggeration, with the result that a dulling of the senses, skepticism and finally disbelief are inevitable.
— Victor Klemperer, ‘The Curse of the Superlative’
LTI – Lingua Tertii Imperii: Notizbuch eines Philologen
(The Language of the Third Reich), 1947
The three-part People’s Daily attack on what it dubbed ‘Writing in a Hyperbolic and Boastful Style’ in early July 2018, translated and reproduced below, follows in the grand Communist tradition of rhetorical hypocrisy. Despite his denunciation of ‘stereotyped Party writing’ 黨八股 in 1942, Mao Zedong was himself the author of reams of wordy and overblown Communist Partyspeak. As for Xi Jinping, after only five years in power the deluge of the party-state-army leader’s logorrhea threatens to submerge the not-inconsiderable writings of Mao, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping combined. It comes as no surprise that anecdotal accounts suggest that Xi’s works are read with the same enthusiasm that greeted the bloviation of previous leaders.
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In the wake of the military coup of October 1976 that ousted the recently-dead Mao’s political faction — a group best called the ‘Gang of Four + 1′ — the Party media, now under new management, launched an attack on what it called ‘Gang Style’ 幫文風 writing, propaganda and speechifying. It was summed up as ‘Mendacious, Hyperbolic and Fatuous’ 假、大、空. The aim was to still the residual gusts of wind 遺風 of the Mao era.
From late 1978, Party leaders claimed they would return to the days before the Cultural Revolution to recuperate the Yan’an tradition of ‘Seeking Truth from Facts’ 實事求是. Before the linguistic atom bomb of High Maoism, however, wild exaggeration and overstatement were already de rigueur in Party propaganda and media reports. In the 1950s, for example, Party decisions were routinely hailed as stunning victories for the people, and every move of the leadership reflected unparalleled sagacity. The echo chamber of self-congratulation had profound, and murderous effects, first during the mass elimination of class enemies in the early 1950s, then during the Hundred Flowers Movement and subsequent purge of ‘Rightists’ in 1956-1957, and ultimately and monumentally, in the self-delusional policies of the Great Leap Forward when Mao and the Party convinced themselves that China was on the verge of entering a Communist Utopia.

As the death toll mounted due to economic dislocation and bureaucratic folly was egged on by reckless media bombast, the Party reluctantly moved to correct policy missteps which, among other things, it euphemistically referred to as an ‘ill wind’ 歪風. The worst of all was the ‘Communist Wind’ 共產風, a gale-force hurricane generated by Mao Zedong and his sycophants that imposed the collectivisation of agricultural production, rural life and an attempted dissolution of private property itself. With much of the country laid waste finally, in late 1960, Mao reluctantly drafted a formal Party directive blaming the devastation on The Five Winds 五風 of Bureaucratism 官僚主義風, Commanding from On High 強迫命令風, Rash Leadership 瞎指揮, Wild Exaggeration 浮誇風 and Communisation 共產風.
Evil Winds or Devilish Airs 妖風 billowed also at the inception of the Cultural Revolution, an era conventionally dated 1966 to 1976, although its ideological year-span is closer to 1964 to 1978. ‘Reply to Comrade Kuo Mo-jo, 七律 · 和郭沫若同志, a lu shih‘, a famous poem by Mao dated 17 November 1961 (quoted in A Monkey King’s Journey to the East, China Heritage, 1 January 2017) was ostensibly a critique of the Soviet Union, but its references to the classical novel Journey to the West 西遊記 were soon used in metaphors about rebellion against the status quo in China itself.
A thunderstorm burst over the earth, 一從大地起風雷
So a devil rose from a heap of white bones. 便有精生白骨堆。
The deluded monk was not beyond the light, 僧是愚氓猶可訓,
But the malignant demon must wreak havoc. 妖為鬼蜮必成災。
The Golden Monkey wrathfully swung his massive cudgel 金猴奮起千鈞棒,
And the jade-like firmament was cleared of dust. 玉宇澄清萬里埃。
Today, a miasmal mist once more rising, 今日歡呼孫大聖,
We hail Sun Wu-kung, the wonder-worker. 只緣妖霧又重來。
The thunderstorm bursting over the earth was reinterpreted to mean the political struggle in China, and the Demon Mist 妖霧 represented the enemies of Mao Zedong Thought. Mao and his supporters were the Golden Monkey Sun Wukong who would unleash chaos on the world as a prelude to a new age of revolution.
Mao also used an expression inspired by the novel Journey to the West to ridicule Peking University, which to his mind was a bastion of reaction, ‘There’s a formidable Devil Wind at that small temple,’ he is believed to have said. ‘The pond there might be shallow but it is full of turtles [bastards] 廟小妖風大,池淺王八多. Attacks on writers and intellectuals were also couched in terms of beating back Demon Winds 妖風, while the nationwide purge called for true revolutionaries to ‘Sweep Away All Cow-demons and Snake-spirits’ 橫掃一切牛鬼蛇神.
The juddering end of the Cultural Revolution era came with winds of its own: there was the Anti-Lin Biao Rectification Movement 批林整風運動 from late 1971 to mid 1973, and the unforgettably named Criticise Deng Xiaoping and Repudiate the Right-wing Wind to Overturn Verdicts 批鄧、反擊右傾翻案風 campaign of 1975-1976. Over the four decades since the Cultural Revolution, even as the Communists have initiated reality based policies based on empirical evidence, an ingrained totalitarian mindset has meant that in many areas and over many periods the Party has expressed itself through overstatement, bellicosity, extremism, emotionalism and militancy. These remain key features of Party communications today. Of course, over the years there have also been periods when reality has broken through the excessive rhetorical overreach which have invariably led to a dose of self-correction. After all, the Party lauds itself as being uniquely capable of ‘self-perfection’ 自我完善. The following essays reflect one of these periods of limited self-correction but, for better or worse, the hyperbole 浮誇 and self-aggrandisement 自大 criticised below remain at the core of the Party’s worldview, one it encourages among the citizens of the People’s Republic.
Blasting Winds of Bombast & Coruscating China
One of the tendencies that had to be modulated resulted from the increased sycophancy encouraged by the Party due to Xi Jinping’s irresistible rise. By 2016, media commentators had identified what they called Shit-scared Prose 嚇尿體 (writing about how foreigners are terrified of China’s achievements and looming Chinese dominance) as being typical of Xi-era populist hubris. Although the three People’s Daily essays translated below address the dangers of recent hyperbole and self-aggrandisement, their authors tiptoe along a propagandist’s tight rope: while online content providers and individual writers were chided for their rhetorical overreach, the articles are taking to task a media environment in which the Party is the ultimate arbiter. The world of hype and overstatement is concocted, authored, guided, sculpted and disseminated either directly by or with the immediate involvement of the Communist apparat. But, since the Party has both the first, and the last, word on such matters, vox populi is expected to fall silent when confronted by vox Dei.
The authority of the Party’s Propaganda Department — euphemistically recast as the ‘publicity department’ in the 1990s (although internationally the head of the system is sometimes called China’s ‘information minister’) — has been greatly enhanced since a major party-state restructure initiated in March 2018. So, it might be argued that the Three Critiques are an expression of the expanded purview of Party publicists, even if the essays generally do little more than amplify previous warnings, including remarks made by the propaganda chief Liu Qibao 劉奇葆 in early 2017. Regardless of that, in effect, the task of the propagandists of a one-party Communist state is to deal with constant shifts in policy and language. An essential requirement of their job involves therefore a form of ‘semanticide’, the repeated making of a rod for their own back. But, as Mao Zedong once observed:
To lift a boulder only to drop it on your own feet is a Chinese way of saying stupid.
搬起石頭打自己的腳,這是中國人形容某些蠢人的行為的一句俗話。
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Amazing China 厲害了, 我的國 was a six-part CCTV and China Film production released on 2 March 2018. It was developed on the basis of an earlier TV documentary called Coruscating China 輝煌中國 (also officially called Amazing China in English). In it the narrator hailed the first five years of Xi Jinping’s reign (December 2012 to October 2017), extolling in the most gushing terms developments in science, technology, industry as well as in poverty reduction. In April 2018, the Party Propaganda Department issued instructions for Amazing China to be given the widest possible release, both online and in cinemas.

The ‘Blasting Winds of Bombast’ discussed below may not mention Amazing China by name, but by implication the production is identified in the righteous finger-wagging.
— GRB
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Related Material:
- Mao Zedong, Rectify the Party’s Style of Work, 1 February 1942; 毛澤東, 整頓黨的作風,1942年2月1日
- Mao Zedong, Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing, 8 February 1942; 毛澤東, 反對黨八股, 1942年2月8日
- David E. Apter and Tony Saich, Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994
- Victor Klemperer, LTI — Lingua Tertii Imperii, The Language of the Third Reich, A Philologist’s Notebook, translated by Martin Brady, London: Continuum, 2000
- 高华, 《紅太陽是怎樣升起的——延安整風的來龍去脈》, online PDF
- Geremie R. Barmé, ‘Red Eclipse’, in Red Rising, Red Eclipse: China Story Yearbook 2012, 2013
- Heritage Glossary, China Heritage (in particular the entries on Tides 潮 and Zheteng 折騰)
- The Yanks Are Scared Shitless — The Social Causes Behind the Popularity of ‘Shit-scared Prose’ 「美國嚇尿了」,嚇尿體橫行的社會原因, SinaBlog, 7 October 2016
- Liu Qibao 劉奇葆, We Are Constantly Reforming Our Writing Style 改文風永遠在路上, Xinhua, 3 March 2017
- The Yanks Are Scared Shitless, The Japs Are Fainting in Floods of Tears — Why is China Full of ‘Shit-scared Prose’? 美國嚇尿了,日本哭暈了…「嚇尿體」為什麼橫行中國社會, Wenxue City, 24 February 2018
- Gao Hua, How the Red Sun Rose: The Origin and Development of the Yan’an Rectification Movement, 1930–1945, translated by Stacey Mosher and Guo Jian, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2018
- News Media according to Xi Jinping Thought (2018 edition)《習近平新聞思想講義(2018年版)》, Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe and Xuexi Chubanshe, 2018, summarised in ‘Seven “New Dimensions” in Xi Thought and the Media’ 習近平新聞思想的七個「新」, China Youth Network (Zhongguo qingnianwang), 10 July 2018
Three Critiques of Inflatuation
from People’s Daily
On 3 July 2018, David Bandurski of the China Media Project reported that:
Yesterday, the Party’s official People’s Daily began running a series of commentaries on the pitfalls of “boastful and arrogant” discourse, warning that “certain media” had become careless. These “certain media,” we should note, were not fringe voices, but rather mainstream Party ones. The first piece criticized is sourced to China Central Television, and was shared on a number of official news sites back in March. The second is a video produced by Weichen Finance, posted to Tencent Video, that quotes Tsinghua University economics professor Hu Angang — who has in recent years loudly advocated the view that China’s current political system is superior to systems in the West — to support the view that China already has a technological edge on the United States.
Missing from the criticism in the People’s Daily, of course, is any acknowledgement that the Party’s own information controls, which have emphasized positive news, trumpeted “positive energy,” and militated against criticism, could possibly bear any responsibility for China’s inflated view of itself.
— Dialing Down the Hype
China Media Project
3 July 2018
The decision by People’s Daily to publish three articles on the theme of the negative impact of bombast in the Chinese media is certainly an indication of the significance of the topic, as well as a way to advance the argument beyond the more obvious: that, as David Bandurski points out in the above, after years of rhetorical excess, China was trying to ‘dial down the hype’ about it economic successes and global power (as well as the increasing perception that it is a threat to the international ‘rules-based order’ itself) during a period of particular sensitivity in the Sino-American trade relationship. It also came at a time when the party-state was reviewing the possible overreach of its worldwide aspirations.
The three articles translated below were published seriatim under collective pen names in the Opinion Pages of the online version of People’s Daily, the official media organ of the Chinese Communist Party. They would have most probably been written under the guidance of the Party’s Propaganda Department and this is why independent online commentary was particularly scathing: critics of the critiques immediately lambasted the articles and pointed out that as the Party propaganda system was the main source of media hyperbole and bombast, such editorial finger-wagging deserved nothing but contempt. Selected quotations from these lambasting responses are interspersed in the text, clearly marked.
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Just what these essays might signify in the broader context of Communist Party politics and infighting in mid 2018 is something for expert analysts — Chinese observers, both in and outside the People’s Republic, academic political scientists and media specialists cum-China Watchers — to divine. Such analysts have well-honed instincts and are quick to discern in the political miasma of Beijing the slightest hint of trouble. To recall our theme of ‘wind’, they can, as the Chinese expression puts it detect ‘how the grass moves when the wind blows 風吹草動. Indeed, some of their number may wonder whether the Three Critiques reveal some hint of discord within the ideological sphere of Xi Jinping’s New Epoch, or are they a result of complaints from the science and tech communities about the damaging reputational effects of populist media hype? Or, perhaps they like a seismograph of some subterranean power struggle? The strict paternalism of the Xi era is built on the silencing of factional voices and the strict maintenance of a surface pretense that the nation and the party support Xi Jinping and all of his doings unwaveringly. As in the past, the monolithic facade of Party unity hides ceaseless and vicious infighting.
The articles are aimed at a number of things: the usual round of cleaning up of media liberalism; a response to bombast and hyper-nationalist fervor during a delicate period in Sino-US trade relations when China is trying to attempt a partial return to hide-and-bide coyness after the recent years of triumphalism under Xi Jinping’s policy of ‘we’re here; we’re mean; get used to it’. They reflect efforts by propagandists who are attempting to tame, ride and warn cultural creators, and not just nationalist extremists: the Party knows what the bottom line is and you must not exceed popular (i.e., Party determined) norms or values. And, above all, as demonstrated in the last essay: in this period of the festering Xi Jinping Personality Cult, the essays are a shameless pandering to Xi Jinping the Thinker and the Man of Letters. While it is uncertain how many people (other than a few outside observers and readers with attitude) actually read People’s Daily apart from as a way to take cues or to acquire the à la mode new language required in Party meetings, one thing is for certain: the Party’s leaders and their propaganda hacks take it very seriously. The only thing they want to see reflected in the darkling mirror of their media outlets is their own image.
— GRB
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Related Material:
- 鏟除「鸚鵡學舌式」的文風, People’s Forum, 30 May 2018
- 黨媒批〝跪求體〞文風浮誇 網民:賊喊捉賊, New Tang Dynasty TV, 3 July 2018
- 人民日報批浮誇文風 網友:始作俑者是貴報, Epoch Times, 5 July 2018

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In the course of his exhaustive surveys of Chinese official documentation, the analyst must absorb industrial quantities of the most indigestible stuff; reading Communist literature is akin to munching rhinoceros sausage, or to swallowing sawdust by the bucketful.
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People’s Daily Editorial Preface
Three Critiques of Inflatuation
编者按
There’s nothing trivial about Writing Style or Forms of Expression. 文风无小事。
Of late, a particular style of writing has appeared with increasing regularity, one that relates stories on such themes as ‘Pleading on Bended Knee’, ‘Tearful Befuddlement’ and ‘Being Shit-scared’. The overall effect of such writing has been to undermine public confidence in the media; the pollution of our media environment in this fashion in turn corrupts our national mental wellbeing. This kind of writing in no way contributes to the appropriate edification of the people nor does it lend to our ongoing efforts to undertake their transformative improvement. Furthermore, it is unhelpful in the project of enhancing public unity and fostering a wholesome Internet space. 近期“跪求体”“哭晕体”“吓尿体”等浮夸自大文风频现,消解媒体公信力,污染舆论生态,扭曲国民心态,不利于成风化人、凝聚人心、构建清朗网络空间。
In order to set right a trend in media writing that favours exaggeration and braggadocio, one that values style over substance, while at the same time taking advantage of this moment to continue our support for writing that is ‘concise, grounded and salutary’ — as articulated by General Secretary Xi Jinping — we champion a vibrant writing style that celebrates shimmering clarity of expression. It is to that end, that starting today the People’s Network is publishing a series of opinion pieces under the title ‘Three Critiques of Writing in a Hyperbolic and Boastful Style’. 为了匡正各媒体浮夸自大、华而不实的文风,落实习近平总书记对文风“短、实、新”的要求,倡导清新文风,崇尚风清气正,今天起,人民网观点频道推出“三评浮夸自大文风”系列评论。
— People’s Daily, 2 July 2018
Translated by Geremie R. Barmé
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