This week, after White House trade adviser Peter Navarro accused China of “profiteering” on the pandemic, President Trump announced that his administration had “serious investigations” underway into the early days of the outbreak in China. At Reuters, Steve Holland and Cate Cadell report on Trump’s comments, and Beijing’s response:

“We’re doing very serious investigations… We are not happy with China,” Trump said at a White House briefing. “There are a lot of ways you can hold them accountable.

“We believe it could have been stopped at the source. It could have been stopped quickly and it wouldn’t have spread all over the world.”

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang told reporters in Beijing that some U.S. politicians were lying to deflect attention from their insufficient response to the virus at home. He did not specifically refer to Trump or Pompeo.

[…] Asked [earlier] about Navarro’s comments, Geng said that the White House adviser was a habitual liar with no credibility, in line with previous comments by China. [Source]

A recent call from Australia for an investigation into the origins and spread of the coronavirus in China attracted rebuke from Beijing this week, and comments from Sweden’s health minister about the need for an investigation are seen as likely to add to strained diplomatic relations with Stockholm.

Since Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 U.S. election, much political commentary has focused on the potential opportunities that his “America First” platform could provide Beijing in its ongoing drive for international influence. As the world began grappling with the spread of the novel coronavirus, Chinese authorities last month sought to cast China as a leader in the global fight against the pandemic. However, official conduct is threatening to squander what The New York Times’ Steven Lee Myers and Alissa J. Rubin described as Beijing’s “chance to reposition itself not as the authoritarian incubator of a pandemic but as a responsible global leader at a moment of worldwide crisis.”

While facing domestic and international criticism for the late disclosure, initial downplaying, and strict control of information related to the Wuhan outbreak, Xi Jinping last month urged international cooperation on COVID-19, claimed that China had been “open, transparent, and responsible” in its approach to date, and pledged Beijing’s continued support in the battle against the pandemic. Beijing’s actions in recent months have made that promise harder to take at face value. China’s domestic suppression of information and dissent in the early days of the outbreak, and subsequent diplomatic attempts to win global hearts, minds, and foreign policy agendas have drawn criticism even from longterm ally Iran.

Amid resounding skepticism over China’s official virus statistics, and as infection rates in other countries were climbing rapidly, state media this month reported a 50% increase in the total number of COVID-19-related deaths in Wuhan, citing incorrect initial reporting, omissions, and delays. Last month, foreign ministry official Zhao Lijian spread a conspiracy theory that the U.S. military created and released the virus–part of a trend of Chinese officials using Twitter to spread propaganda and disinformation–and many other foreign social media accounts linked to Beijing have been documented spreading coronavirus disinformation. This month, Beijing put new restrictions on academic research into COVID-19, pressured science journal Nature into apologizing for linking its coverage of the virus to China, left critical protective gear stranded in limbo with new export restrictions, and was called out for asking local governments across the globe to publicly praise Beijing’s response to the outbreak. Meanwhile, while also waging an aggressive campaign criticizing foreign countries for their domestic epidemic responses, Beijing has been actively pursuing other longterm foreign policy goals. At Vox, Alex Ward reports:

China has capitalized on the world’s distraction to claim sovereignty over disputed islands in the South China Sea, intimidate Taiwan, and assert more authority over Hong Kong in an attempt to quash the pro-democracy movement there.

It’s taken advantage of vulnerable countries in Africa that are struggling to cope with the coronavirus and its economic impact by offering much-needed debt relief — but only if those countries provide lucrative national assets as collateral.

[…] “Everything they’re doing is a full-court press,” said Michael Sobolik, an expert on China at the American Foreign Policy Council. “Across the board, China is pushing hard.”

Experts say this is all part of Xi’s broader strategy to dislodge America as the world’s sole superpower and expand China’s reach around the world. In other words, he’s merely exploiting the coronavirus crisis to achieve his aims even faster. [Source]

At The New York Times last week, Steven Lee Myers reported on how Xi’s use of the pandemic to consolidate power, demand praise, and shift blame away from China is damaging Beijing’s global credibility:

The lasting effect on Mr. Xi’s global ambitions could be profound. China’s relationship with the United States has already cratered, despite a rhetorical truce reached between Mr. Xi and President Trump. Now there is evidence the pandemic is forcing other countries to rethink relations.

[…] “How they operate domestically spills over into how they operate internationally,” said Susan L. Shirk, the chairwoman of the 21st Century China Center at the University of California, San Diego.

That means brooking no dissent, controlling the flow of information, emphasizing the central role of the Communist Party leadership and rarely, if ever, acknowledging mistakes.

[…] This newly aggressive tone — which Ms. Shirk and others attributed to Mr. Xi’s directives — risks alienating countries and provoking accusations like those China often makes about politicizing a public health emergency. [Source]

At Foreign Policy this week, James Traub questioned the practicality of analyzing the post-pandemic global order in terms of a competition between the “China model” and the dominant, U.S.-led neoliberal international order. After noting the many damaging instances of official conduct from both Washington and Beijing in their pandemic messaging and response efforts, Traub suggested that both troubled superpowers could derive lessons from the pandemic:

The pandemic has raised the stakes of the competition from a struggle for economic dominance to a contest between rival models. Whose system is better designed to adapt to the global crises, whether of public health or the climate, that lie in our future? The United States fostered the liberal world order after World War II and has sustained it ever since. That order has persisted not only because of U.S. military and economic predominance, but because it has promoted the interests of its leading members (including China). Is that era now drawing to a close? Does the arrow of the future point towards liberal democracy or free-market authoritarianism?

[…] While Chinese authorities were desperately hiding the truth, officials in Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong—and Singapore soon after—began screening at their borders and quarantining the sick, and then swiftly ramped up the production of protective gear and testing kits. The first two are vibrant democracies that feature open elections, independent judiciaries, and untrammeled free enterprise. (Singapore’s model is closest to China’s, though an independent civil service largely directs affairs of state.) Together, they have shown what is possible when citizens and the state respect rather than fear one another. Hong Kong has had four coronavirus deaths, Taiwan six, Singapore 12, and South Korea 240.

If some model has emerged as the winner of this dreadful sweepstakes, it is not China’s authoritarian one but rather that of the democracies that share China’s “Asian values” of collective discipline, deference to authority, and faith in the state. […]

[…] So yes, China has already “won” in the sense that Washington continues to dispute; soon it will be absurd to question its economic and technocratic supremacy. But it has not won in the sense that matters most, as a model for other nations. Germany has something to teach its European neighbors. Australia has something to teach the United States, its cultural near-twin. South Korea and Taiwan have something to teach China about the application of “Asian values.” It would be a fine thing if this global catastrophe could force nations to learn from their own failures. Even the United States. Even China. [Source]

As Washington and Beijing continue to highlight areas of respective blame, a recent Pew survey found a 20 point increase in negative views of China over the last three years, and the GOP has made China’s coronavirus complicity a major 2020 campaign strategy. While American reactions are consistent with the two countries’ existing tensions, China also faces mounting criticism elsewhere. French and German leaders have spoken out against China’s opacity over the outbreak, while Britain’s foreign secretary, citing similar concerns, has said there will be no return to “business as usual” in its relations with China. This may include the derailment of the UK’s controversial decision to allow Chinese telecoms giant Huawei a limited role in its 5G mobile networks. Bloomberg’s Alan Crawford and Peter Martin reported last week on the European backlash, including calls to prevent Chinese takeovers of companies weakened by the pandemic and to reduce reliance on Chinese manufacturing in fields well beyond medical supplies.​

Diplomats talk of mounting anger over China’s behavior during the coronavirus pandemic including claims of price gouging by Chinese suppliers of medical equipment and a blindness to how its actions are perceived. The upshot is that Beijing’s handling of the crisis has eroded trust just when it had a chance to demonstrate global leadership.​

“Over these months China has lost Europe,” said Reinhard Buetikofer, a German Green Party lawmaker who chairs the European Parliament’s delegation for relations with China. He cited concerns from China’s “truth management” in the early stages of the virus to an “extremely aggressive” stance by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing and “hard line propaganda” that champions the superiority of Communist Party rule over democracy.

​[…] An anonymously authored text posted on the website of the Chinese embassy in France this month falsely accused French retirement home staff of leaving old people to die. It was “an incredible accusation on one of the most sensitive and tragic aspects” of the crisis in France, Mathieu Duchatel of the Institut Montaigne wrote on Twitter.

The embassy website comments rang alarm bells for the needless offense caused. China underestimated the reaction to its conspiracy theories amplified by propaganda outlets, according to two European officials in Beijing. What’s more, China’s insistence that aid be accompanied by public thanks and praise has undercut the goodwill it might otherwise have gained, they said. [Source]​

Chinese diplomatic missions’ efforts to control the narrative have also backfired elsewhere. A letter from its Sydney consulate to Australia’s Daily Telegraph protesting its coverage of China’s role in the pandemic was published with satirical redactions that reversed its intended message. (Australia’s foreign secretary recently called for an independent inquiry into China’s handling of the outbreak, prompting Global Times editor Hu Xijin to accuse the nation of “political maneuvering”.)

In Canada, the Calgary consulate’s rebuke of Alberta Premier Jason Kenney over a tweet about pro-democrat Martin Lee’s arrest in Hong Kong—a move widely seen as emboldened by the cover offered by the pandemic—was similarly poorly received. In the U.S., consular efforts to plant a resolution praising China’s virus response in the Wisconsin state senate also went awry.​

LSE IDEAS’ Charles Dunst wrote at Foreign Policy on African governments’ responses to the pandemic and to recent mistreatment of their citizens in China:​

Opposition figures in China-friendly countries have long been comfortable using anti-Chinese language to bolster public support. But what should alarm Beijing is that those in office are now joining this chorus of criticism, if on more diplomatic terms.

Ghana’s finance minister declared that China must “come on stronger” on debt relief. Nigeria is seeking a similar respite from China. The leaders of Ethiopia, Senegal, and South Africa have called on the international community, including China, to enact immediate debt relief for the continent.

[…] As part of a wider crackdown on foreigners, now blamed for bringing the virus back to China, police have targeted Africans in particular. The images of Chinese officials pushing around African students and expatriates, evicting them from hotels, and forcing them to sleep on the street have reverberated across the continent—igniting a firestorm of criticism.

[…] Ghana’s minister of foreign affairs and regional integration summoned the Chinese ambassador to discuss the maltreatment of Africans in China. Nigeria’s foreign affairs minister summoned Beijing’s representative in his country to express his “extreme concern at allegations of maltreatment of Nigerians in Guangzhou.” The speaker of Nigeria’s House of Representatives then read the Chinese ambassador the riot act, telling him: “It is almost undiplomatic the way I’m talking, but it’s because I am actually upset about what you’re doing.” [Source]

​At Politico, Simon Marks similarly reported that in Africa, “the novel coronavirus has spawned a growing backlash that threatens to unwind the ties Beijing has carefully cultivated over decades.” On Twitter, China’s Second Continent author Howard French described the abuse of Africans in China as a “political crisis,” not a mere “PR disaster,” while also cautioning against viewing “African politics as a horse race between China and the US.”

Howard French
@hofrench