Contra Trump
造反有理
Zhang Qianfan (張千帆, 1964-) is a professor of constitutional law at Peking University. Readers of China Heritage first encountered him in The Professor, a University & the Rule of Law, a chapter in Xu Zhangrun Case which details Xu’s critiques of the Xi Jinping era, the persecution he has suffered since 2018 and the support he has received by colleagues and people of conscience in China.
The following essay, ‘The Political Natural Law Roots of America’s Downfall’ 美國淪陷的政治自然法根源, which originally appeared in FT中文网, the Chinese edition of the Financial Times, has also enjoyed wide circulation in China. It is one in a series of articles that Professor Zhang, a long-time contributor to FT, has published in the wake of the November 2024 US presidential election. The first of these was America’s Contract is Finally Broken, which appeared on 7 November 2024.
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For the most part, China’s establishment intellectuals — the Skin-and-Hair Intelligentsia 皮毛知識界 — as well as many ronin opinionators tend to be Trumpistas 川粉. Apart from the appeal of authoritarianism, the Trump-Vought-Musk triumvirate also offers an American ‘permission structure’ for misogyny, racism and trans- and homophobia, all of which remain relatively unchecked in the People’s Republic. For more on our view of the Chinese intellectual world since the late 1990s, see ‘Time’s Arrows 無往而不復’, a six-part chapter in Xi Jinping’s Empire of Tedium:
- Time’s Arrows; The Revolution of Resistance; Have We Been Noticed Yet?; Chinese Visions: A Provocation; On China’s Editor-Censors; Ethical Dilemmas — notes for academics who deal with Xi Jinping’s China; and, Fifteen Years of China’s Prosperous Age
In a Chinese-language environment roiled by illiberalism, be it on the performative left or within the pseudo right, Zhang Qianfan’s is a clarion voice that speaks out on behalf of decency and humanistic liberalism. In this endeavour, he is joined by Zi Zhongyun (資中筠, 1930-), a noted expert on American diplomatic history and former head of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing (see: 資中筠,我對馬特“旋風”的看法; and also, 1900 & 2020 — An Old Anxiety in a New Era).
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As we note in the introduction to Contra Trump — America’s Empire of Tedium, over the years China Heritage has recorded some of the discomforting parallels between the histories of modern China and America. We first gazed through our Sino-American lens with the publication of A Monkey King’s Journey to the East on 1 January 2017 on the eve of Trump’s inauguration as president. In the wake of Trump’s electoral defeat in 2020, we launched Spectres & Souls — Vignettes, moments and meditations on China and America, 1861-2021. This was a yearlong discussion in which we suggested that many of the spectres and shades, as well as the enlivening souls and lofty inspirations, that asserted themselves both in China and the United States in 2021 could fruitfully be considered in the context of the 160-year period starting in 1861.
Contra Trump was launched in November 2024, following Donald Trump’s second electoral victory. Given the haunting parallels between Trump’s USA and Xi Jinping’s Chinese Republic we believe that it is time for a new academic and journalistic analytical approach to the Sino-American conundrum. We’ll call it ‘Whataboutism Studies’ and it explores how Horseshoe Theory provides a useful perspective on the bilateral apache dance. The theory suggests that the extreme right — in this case ‘American Fascism’ — and extreme left — China’s bellicose state socialism bend toward each other like the ends of a horseshoe.
In the following essay, Zhang Qianfan uses the metaphor of the Cultural Revolution — as well as references to Red guards, gangs, ‘smashing the public, prosecutorial, and judicial organs’ 砸爛公檢法 — to discuss America’s political crisis. We would also draw the reader’s attention to America’s Cultural Revolution: How the Radical Left Conquered Everything by Christopher F. Rufo, which was published in 2023. Influential among America’s cod thinkers and conspiracy theory zealots, Rufo’s work is also significant because it frames his destructive hopes for ‘educational reform’ in the latter Trump era. For an informed discussion of ‘Cultural Marxism’, the bugbear of Rufo and his ilk, we recommend The Myth of Cultural Marxism – Anatomy of a conspiracy theory, an episode in Origin Story by Ian Dunt and Dorian Lynskey.
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Professor Zhang Qianfan is a friend of China Heritage. It is with his encouragement and the support of Xu Zhangrun that we reprint this essay from China Thought Express 中國思想快遞, a translation venture that publishes works on a variety of China-related topics. It’s self-description says that it delivers ‘insights from top experts in the Chinese-speaking world in real-time’. The original Chinese text of Zhang Qianfan’s article is appended to the translation.
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The Chinese rubric of this chapter in Contra Trump is 造反有理 zào fǎn yǒu lǐ, ‘rebellion is justified’. Drawing on a quotation from Mao Zedong, the expression was used by Luo Xiaohai 駱小海 in ‘Long Live the Spirit of Rebellion’, the three-part Red Guard manifesto used by Mao during the early stage of his 1966 auto-golpe, one aimed at ‘destroying the old world’ or the party-state that he had founded.
— Geremie R. Barmé
Editor, China Heritage
18 February 2025
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A Prefatory Note by the Editors of
China Thought Express
Zhang Qianfan’s The Political Natural Law Roots of America’s Collapse examines the erosion of democracy under Trump’s renewed presidency. Within a month, Trump has disrupted U.S. domestic and foreign policy, from abandoning Ukraine to empowering a “Cultural Revolution Squad” dismantling constitutional checks. Zhang argues that America’s decline stems from a breakdown in political natural law—eroding church-state separation, press freedom, racial equality, and electoral integrity. He likens Trump’s administrative purge to a dictatorship’s centralization of power, using mass support to undermine institutional neutrality.
The judiciary remains a fragile safeguard, but Trump’s influence over courts and businesses suggests a slide toward authoritarianism. Corporate capitulation and legal maneuvering illustrate how the rule of law is giving way to power politics. Zhang warns that without resistance, Trumpism may entrench itself beyond electoral reversal. However, he maintains hope that America’s constitutional framework, if defended, can still restore its democratic foundation before it’s too late.
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The Political Natural Law Roots of America’s Downfall
Zhang Qianfan
Zhang Qianfan (张千帆, b. January 1964) is a Chinese legal scholar and writer from Shanghai. He is currently a professor at Peking University Law School and a director of the Constitutional Law Society of the China Law Society. In 1980, Zhang was admitted to the Department of Physics at Nanjing University. In 1984, he went to the United States for further study, earning a Ph.D. in physics from Carnegie Mellon University in 1989.[1] He later conducted postdoctoral research in physics. In 1992, Zhang enrolled in the University of Maryland School of Law, shifting his focus to social sciences. In 1995, he entered the University of Texas at Austin, where he earned a Ph.D. in government in 1999. After completing his studies, Zhang returned to China. From 1999 to 2002, he served as a professor at Nanjing University Law School. In 2003, he joined Peking University Law School as a professor, specializing in constitutional law, comparative constitutional law, Chinese constitutional law, and constitutional theory. In December 2012, a widely circulated online video titled The Xinhai Revolution and China’s Constitutionalism featured Zhang delivering a sharp critique of the damage that autocratic societies inflict on individual character, as well as the personality deficiencies of the Chinese populace. In February 2019, Introduction to Constitutional Law, a textbook Zhang had edited and which had been in use at Chinese universities for 15 years, was removed from circulation. Reports suggested the ban was linked to accusations that he was “promoting Western institutions.”
Donald Trump has been in office for less than a month, yet he has already stirred a political storm both domestically and on the global stage. If his brazen notion of expelling Palestinians from Gaza merely outraged international justice advocates, his recent betrayal of Ukraine has prompted even certain anti-Russian “Trump fans” to jump ship, regretting they ever supported a faithless turncoat. In truth, all of this was long foreseeable.
During his first term, Trump granted Israel permission to relocate its capital to Jerusalem [sic! Encouraged by his billionaire backers, Trump had the US embassy moved to Jerusalem]—what benevolent act could he possibly offer the Palestinians? Before his second term began, he was already bragging he could “end the Russia–Ukraine war in 24 hours.” Is he divine? What bold gambit could he have besides forcing Ukraine to cede land and surrender? In my piece “The American Contract Is Finally Broken,” published after his election, I offered a stark warning:
Perhaps in the coming years, it won’t be the United States saving the world, but rather the U.S. needing rescue by the civilized world. After World War II and the Cold War, it has long stood as the world’s military colossus. If it opts to destroy the world, can it be stopped? As with Trump’s election, that possibility is not out of the question.[1]
I chose not to delve deeper at the time, convinced it would take a while for the U.S. and Russia or other nations to unite in “destroying the world.” Now, however, it appears a new “axis of evil” is forming. Yet, no matter how dire international developments may seem, these are merely surface manifestations rather than fundamental causes. One should always remember that the guiding premise of liberalism is that domestic institutions shape foreign policy. The consensus in international relations holds that democracies do not wage war against one another—mature democracies do not fight each other. A democracy’s posture toward a dictatorship is harder to predict, and dictator states often engage in treacherous games of survival of the fittest. The United States and Canada used to be ironclad allies, and their border was unfortified. Then, within days of taking office, Trump mused aloud about turning Canada into America’s “51st state” or annexing Greenland, not because Canada or Denmark had changed, but because the U.S. elected an autocrat. With a dictator in power, domestically or abroad, anything becomes possible. In just the past month, drastic shifts in American foreign policy have stunned the world’s “beacon of democracy,” rooted in the fact that it is no longer a normal liberal democracy.
I. The Basic Requirements of Political Natural Law
A normal liberal democracy must meet at least five core conditions under “political natural law”: (1) freedom of belief and the separation of church and state; (2) freedom of speech and the press; (3) racial and ethnic equality, “one person, one vote,” and similar negative equalities; (4) free and fair periodic elections; (5) administrative neutrality and judicial independence. These five principles converge on three mutually reinforcing ideas: liberty, democracy, and the rule of law. For a nation to achieve peace and stability, a majority of its citizens must subscribe to these foundational rules, forming a “contractual community” that upholds them.
Under a typical constitutional regime, the process is: (1) citizens, through open debate, communication, and negotiation, select lawmakers (mostly in a legislature) by some majority-based method; (2) the legislature, following majoritarian procedure, enacts laws meant to protect the interests of at least most citizens; (3) the legislature’s work is faithfully enforced by an executive that remains politically neutral; (4) if executive acts break the law, violating citizens’ rights and interests, both legislative oversight and judicial rulings can serve as checks; (5) in rare cases where legislation infringes on constitutional rights, courts can review and invalidate it, preventing a “tyranny of the majority.”
By that measure, the U.S. is no longer a prototypical constitutional democracy. In fact, even its rule of law has fractured, as points three and four in the above process have been severely compromised. Trump has sent Elon Musk and a “Gang of Six” [六小将, literally ‘six little generals’ — a reference to the fact that, at the time, Red Guards were referred as ‘little revolutionary generals’ 革命小将] into the White House under the guise of a “Cultural Revolution Squad,” seizing key departments, freezing funds, firing personnel, and halting enforcement of laws Congress has passed, all under the banner of rooting out “deep-state corruption.” Some of these “Cultural Revolution” steps have been momentarily blocked by the courts, but the president—America’s chief executive—and his attorney general, in charge of law enforcement, have brazenly declared they will defy court orders. The last time anything like this happened was in 1832, when President Andrew Jackson stated, “(Chief Justice) John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it!” If judicial verdicts cannot be enforced, and Congress cannot rein in executive lawlessness—Republicans now hold majorities in both chambers, turning a blind eye—then Democratic objections are no more than a lone hand clapping.
In the end, the core problem lies with the electorate. Because they were displeased—rightly or wrongly—by certain outcomes of Democratic governance, they opted for a president whose racist, dictatorial impulses had already become glaringly clear in his first term. Without unwavering support from Christian nationalists, had racial and gender biases been less pronounced, had more voters trusted broadly credible mainstream media (on both left and right, including Fox News), rather than swallowing social-media conspiracy theories, Trump would never have come to power.[2]
In other words, both America’s current domestic turmoil and the wider global predicament stem from the rupture of the “American Contract.” A large swath of voters abandoned the first three pillars of political natural law, embracing theocracy, racism, and conspiracy theories. Although the U.S. Constitution still stands, the “contractual community” behind it has dwindled below the critical mass for effective constitutional governance. Indeed, even after a month of “America’s Cultural Revolution,” Trump’s approval rating remains over fifty percent. As many as seventy percent of Americans still think he is “fulfilling his campaign promises.”[3]
To many observers, the idea that the world’s oldest modern constitutional democracy could collapse seems unthinkable. Yet that possibility is now painfully evident to all. One true and famously ironic anecdote is the “Gödel Loophole”: in 1938, after the Nazis annexed Austria, the mathematical logician Kurt Gödel, famed for proving the “incompleteness theorems,” fled to the U.S. In 1947, while studying for his citizenship exam, he discovered a loophole in the U.S. Constitution. Albert Einstein escorted him to his court interview, where the examining judge asked what form of government Austria had. Gödel replied, “It was a republic, but the constitution eventually morphed into a dictatorship.” Proudly, the federal appeals judge declared that such a thing could never happen in America. Gödel answered, “How can you be sure? I can prove otherwise!”[4] Of course, it is not proof but an empty proposition: if a system of government is built and sustained by humans, then nothing is inconceivable. Today, the “loophole” Gödel warned about has fully manifested itself in the U.S., though perhaps not as he initially envisioned.
II. Who Decides How Big Government Should Be?
The democratic collapse usually arises from dissatisfaction with democracy—economic recessions, rising unemployment, societal disruption from globalization, surges in immigration, advances by racial or gender minorities, and the decline of Christian culture or white dominance. Those grievances collectively propel a populist leader who vows to “appease the people.” With grassroots support, that populist figure can hack away at the mechanisms preventing dictatorship; a professional, rule-of-law bureaucracy is attacked as a “deep state” of entrenched interests. In the U.S., that figure is the president. Consequently, the first target of his sword is naturally the executive branch he leads—the very heart of the “deep state.”
Like every country, America’s executive branch is “big.” Neither the legislature nor the judiciary can match its scale. There are only 535 voting members in both houses of Congress and about thirty thousand staffers; the federal judiciary at all three levels has under nine hundred judges, supported by roughly thirty thousand employees. Meanwhile, the executive branch includes about four million three hundred thousand personnel: two million two hundred thousand civilian workers (excluding six hundred thirty thousand postal employees) and two million one hundred thousand in the armed forces (including eight hundred thousand reservists). Note that the military, while distinctive in function, is merely another group of civil servants whose sworn duty is to uphold the law on behalf of the people. Whether civilian or military, their loyalty is pledged not to a leader but to the law. Of the nearly five million federal workers, over ninety-eight percent work in the executive. The states follow a similar pattern, as do other nations. Thus, when people speak of “the state” or “the government,” they almost always refer to the executive branch.
One might say, “Government’s so bloated—slash it!” But if you harbor any commitment to democracy, you should think twice. Such an array of departments and employees, and the funding each requires, isn’t decided by some official’s whim. Congress—elected by the people—meets for months to hammer out legislation that determines agencies’ scope, budgets, and missions, whether the Federal Reserve or the Environmental Protection Agency, or the Department of Defense. So who are you to simply declare cuts? You might claim Elon Musk is brilliant—he runs private enterprises so well, so let him do the trimming. But who does Musk represent? Himself, not the electorate. Certainly, government can be excessive, but determining who should be cut and who should remain cannot be decided by someone lacking democratic legitimacy.
Many in China’s so-called “liberal” circles, never having lived under a genuinely democratic system, assume a smaller government is always better, essentially adopting an anarchic stance due to inexperience. Even in the United States, most conservatives would never agree to abolish the police. Since FDR’s New Deal nearly a century ago, a government serving only as a “night watchman” is unrealistic, even in a relatively conservative America. A larger government can indeed be inefficient or corrupt, but so long as it has not morphed into a form familiar to many in China, any reforms—whether downsizing or reorganizing—must be left to legislatures and democratic procedure, not a band of “revolutionary youths.”
You may protest: “Trump was elected. Can’t he downsize the executive and freeze its budget? Clinton negotiated the departure of nearly four hundred thousand federal employees, so how is Trump any different—and more decisive?” But recall that Clinton’s cuts resulted from nearly a year of transparent investigation, public input, and ultimately broad bipartisan backing in Congress. The president does have the power to propose an annual budget, even to “diminish his own powers” by trimming departmental allocations. Nonetheless, no budget takes effect without approval from both chambers. Indeed, the budget is arguably Congress’s most critical legislation. Has the Trump administration solicited any feedback for its sweeping plan? Even if cuts are warranted, they must wait for a new budget law to pass both houses. This deliberate failure to implement or outright defiance of existing congressional mandates is grounds for impeachment—a fate President Andrew Johnson nearly faced. But since Republicans hold a majority in both chambers, impeachment is off the table. That illustrates how, even in America, one-party rule can thwart checks and balances, leaving little but the naked exercise of personal authority.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the American rule of law was undeveloped, the government small, and presidents or party bosses were free to wield sweeping power. A patronage-driven “spoils system” governed personnel from the secretary of the state down to the janitor, leading to nepotism, inefficiency, and corruption. At the turn of the twentieth century, under Progressive reforms, the 1883 Pendleton Act established a modern civil service distinguishing political appointees (with policymaking roles) from career civil servants (tasked with routine enforcement). Because presidents need a collaborative team, top political positions remain patronage-based. That’s why Trump can name an in-law as ambassador to France. These appointees number about three thousand senior roles—far more than in other democracies—but they represent under 0.1 percent of a massive public workforce. Meanwhile, civil servants must pass exams to be hired on merit, with legal protections for job stability. The attorney general wields great power and can be fired at will, while a low-level Justice Department lawyer, however insignificant, cannot be fired arbitrarily without cause—and can appeal to a Civil Service Protection Board or the courts. Every year, the U.S. sees a vast volume of lawsuits against government agencies, one-third of them from civil servants fighting for their rights.
Only when civil servants’ pay and positions enjoy relative independence can administrative enforcement stay fair and impartial. Otherwise, if one’s livelihood depends on superiors, who would dare defy orders? Observers in China will recognize the hazard. That is why American films often depict minor officials exposing high-level corruption, a scenario that does occasionally arise, thanks to the structural autonomy of everyday government employees. This independence underpins America’s administrative rule of law. Now, Trump aims to dismantle administrative neutrality—allowing him to fire civil servants at will, as if running a family corporation—and revert to a nineteenth-century patronage culture, forging a dictatorship answerable only to himself.
III. How Far Can an American-Style “Cultural Revolution” Go?
With its deep-seated legal tradition and longstanding commitment to administrative neutrality, the only way to dismantle America’s “deep state” is through a “Cultural Revolution.” Essentially, the Cultural Revolution means the supreme leader orchestrating a mass movement to “smash the public, prosecutorial, and judicial organs,” [砸爛公檢法] harnessing ordinary citizens to root out disobedient elites. Trump has leveraged outside forces by installing an “Elon Musk Trojan Horse” in the White House. His handpicked Treasury secretary and other confidants have given the “Gang of Six” carte blanche to launch an “internal revolution” under the banner of “anti-corruption,” accessing government secrets, slashing staff, even shutting down essential agencies—until the entire civil service bends to the president’s will.
If this trend persists, the death knell for America’s rule of law, democracy, and freedom will soon toll. As Professor Steven Levitsky warns, the government wields immense resources, which, if monopolized by one president or party, will be systematically deployed to weaken the opposition.[5] We know well that if agencies like law enforcement, prosecution, or taxation surrender their neutrality to a single party, they can selectively conduct “tax audits,” “anti-corruption probes,” or “environmental inspections” against political rivals. Modern governments hold an arsenal of economic privileges—licenses, contracts, tax breaks—that can reward allies and punish critics. As the cost of protest rises, elites and ordinary citizens alike may yield to “if you play along, you prosper; if not, you fall,” driving America deeper into a “prisoner’s dilemma” where everyone fears being the proverbial nail hammered down. Fewer people dare to speak out, with diminishing effect, until the First Amendment is reduced to an empty text: constitutional in name but bereft of constitutional governance [that is, ‘having a constitution bereft of constitutional rule’ 有宪法无宪政].
In the meantime, America’s business community, pursuing its own interests, has fallen in line with the new regime. Amazon, known for bold acquisitions and tough negotiating, spent forty million dollars for exclusive rights to a documentary on the First Lady’s “return to the White House.” Trump had previously sued several media outlets for “infringement,” with those suits initially going nowhere—then, after his election, each paid handsome “settlements.” Meta had suspended Trump’s account in 2021 after the Capitol riot, allegedly violating his “freedom of speech.” In November 2024, when Mark Zuckerberg attended a dinner at Mar-a-Lago, Trump bluntly stated that if Meta wanted “no trouble” from the new president, the lawsuit had to be settled. Meta then paid twenty-five million dollars in a “settlement.” Disney’s ABC News paid fifteen million to settle Trump’s “defamation” claim.[6] Is Trump not a “public figure” subject to greater scrutiny under defamation law? Was he not in part responsible for the Capitol riot? The actions of these business elites show they no longer trust American law. Faced with a choice between law and power, they have chosen power. That bodes ill for America’s rule of law.
Some might argue that the independent judiciary stands as “the last bulwark of fairness.” It is true that life tenure has so far limited Trump’s ability to reshape the courts. Still, as Judge Learned Hand warned, if society heads downhill overall, judges cannot save it. Indeed, the American judiciary is hardly impregnable. First, the Supreme Court holds a 6–3 conservative majority, and Trump’s term could shift that further. The Court has already granted the president absolute immunity for “official acts” while in office, effectively handing him carte blanche for misconduct. Second, judges, like other high officials, are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate; Trump can continue appointing loyalists who reshape the judiciary’s makeup. Finally, for those judges who adhere to principle, the administration can unleash “anti-corruption” probes or threaten impeachment. Though impeachment demands a high threshold—the same as impeaching a president—merely passing a House majority resolution to initiate it is enough to send a chilling message.
The final hope, of course, rests in regular elections. If Trump’s excesses spark a genuine crisis, outraging the public and alienating his own base, the Republican Party will pay at the ballot box. Two or four years from now, they could be thrown out of power. Yet nothing is certain in the interim. Some “Trump fans” are already urging him to seek a “third term,” and rumors say he is considering it. If he can contemplate amending the Constitution, there may be no limit to his ambitions. Republicans have long embraced gerrymandering—[they are] famous for it—so beyond overtly suppressing opposition, they could manipulate election rules to ensure “permanent rule.” That would destroy the five principles of political natural law, leaving the U.S. a full-blown authoritarian regime.
IV. America’s Hope
I do not seek to paint a hopeless picture of the United States, but the breakneck developments in just one month of Trump’s tenure are alarming. The ancient sage Mencius observed, “Prosperity arises in adversity; complacency brings ruin.” [生於憂患,死於安樂] In facing America’s present peril, neither optimism nor despair will do. Without question, the U.S. still holds promise, but it cannot indulge the blind faith of the judge who tested Gödel. If it lets down its guard, what befell Germany could readily recur here, and indeed, partial eruptions have happened before—just not nationwide. As America drifts from the “Nash equilibrium” of constitutional democracy toward that of authoritarianism, it still retains a largely intact constitutional framework. As everywhere, the spark of democratic resilience lies in resistance, and America has enough tools, low enough costs, and a strong enough opposition to fight back. If the dissenting side is overwhelmed by pessimism, the result can only be swift decline and eternal downfall.
Yes, the “beacon of democracy” has dimmed, but the greatest chance of reigniting it remains in American hands. The country still possesses nearly all the elements of political natural law: a mostly intact electoral system, a largely neutral civil service, a highly independent judiciary, and few real limits on free speech or a free press. Although some voters have trouble with church-state separation, racial equality, or political literacy—perhaps momentarily swayed by passing emotions or short-term interests over crucial principles—these individuals can change before the political climate collapses beyond salvage. They must realize there is no savior, no “chosen one.” Whoever openly tramples the Constitution is not a hero but a criminal. An American “Cultural Revolution” brings neither honesty nor efficiency—only the demolition of the rule of law essential to everyone’s survival.
Only if such voters awaken, and those already alert refuse to give in, can America’s “contractual community” regain its vitality. Only then will the charade of an American “Cultural Revolution” come to an end, and the civilized world will witness the return of its “beacon of democracy.”
Notes:
- Zhang Qianfan (张千帆), “America’s Contract Finally Broken,” Financial Times Chinese Edition, November 7, 2024.
- Zhang Qianfan (张千帆), “‘American Contract’ Status Check, Part 1: Racial Attitudes and Their Political Impact,” Financial Times Chinese Edition, December 17, 2024; “‘American Contract’ Status Check, Part 2: The Political Consequences of Christian Nationalism,” Financial Times Chinese Edition, December 20, 2024; “‘American Contract’ Status Check, Part 3: The Social Media Challenge,” Financial Times Chinese Edition, December 23, 2024.
- Anthony Salvanto et al., “CBS News Poll—Trump Has Positive Approval Amid ‘Energetic’ Opening Weeks; Seen as Doing What He Promised,” CBS News, February 9, 2025, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-approval-opinion-poll-2025-2-9/.
- F. E. Guerra-Pujol, “Gödel’s Loophole,” Capital University Law Review, 41 (2013): 637–673.
- Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “The Breakdown of Democracy: The Road to Authoritarianism in the United States,” https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20250213A003RU00.
- Rebecca Ballhaus, Dana Mattioli, and Annie Linskey, “How the Trumps Turned an Election Victory into a Cash Bonanza,” Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/politics/elections/trump-family-election-cash-bonanza-2f5f8714.
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Source:
- Zhang Qianfan, ‘The Political Natural Law Roots of America’s Downfall’ 美利坚沦陷的政治自然法根源, China Thought Express, 18 February 2025. The translation was authorised by the author and undertaken by the China Thought Express editorial team. Links and additions in square brackets have been added by China Heritage. Professor Zhang’s essay is included in Contemporary China Review (Spring Issue, 2025), published by Bouden House in New York.
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美利坚沦陷的政治自然法根源
张千帆
2025年02月17日
特朗普上台不到一个月,已在国内和国际舞台上刮起政坛旋风。如果说他要把巴勒斯坦人从加沙赶走的雷人设想只是激怒了国际正义人士,那么他最近对乌克兰的背叛则甚至让某些反俄“川粉”倒戈,后悔支持了一个背信弃义的小人。其实,这一切都是早已料定的。特朗普在第一任内,就允许以色列把首都迁到耶路撒冷,他能对巴勒斯坦做什么好事呢?第二任上任前,他就口出狂言“24小时结束俄乌战争”。他真的是神吗?能有什么大招?不就是让乌克兰割地投降吗?在他当选后的“美国契约终于破裂”一文中,我曾撂下一句“狠话”:
也许在未来几年,不再是美国拯救世界,而是美国需要文明世界拯救。但问题是,在经过二战和冷战之后,它早已成为军力独占鳌头的世界“老大”。如果它想摧毁世界,世界还能否阻挡?就和特朗普当选一样,这个可能并非不存在。
当时没有展开,因为觉得美国要和俄罗斯等国联起手来“摧毁世界”还有待时日,但现在看来,“邪恶轴心”正在形成。然而,国际局势再险恶,都只是表象而非根源。永远要记住的是,自由主义的标志性立场是国内制度决定国际政策。国际关系领域的通说是,民主国家无战争,成熟的民主国家之间是不会打仗的。民主国家对独裁国家就不好说了,独裁国家之间更是尔虞我诈、弱肉强食。美加原来是铁杆盟国,边境都互不设防。特朗普一上台,就一会儿要把它变成美国的“第51个州”,一会儿要吞并格林兰岛,不是因为加拿大或丹麦变了,而是美国选上了一位独裁狂人。独裁者当政,则无论国内国际,一切皆有可能发生。美国近一个月来国际政策的陡变让世界对“民主灯塔”大跌眼镜,根源在于它已不是一个正常的自由民主国家。
一、政治自然法的基本要求
一个正常的自由民主国家需要符合政治自然法的五点最低要求:(1)信仰自由与政教分离;(2)言论与新闻自由;(3)族群平等、“一人一票”等消极平等;(4)自由与公正的周期性选举;(5)行政中立与司法独立。这五点原则可以被总结为相辅相成的三个方面:自由、民主、法治。一个国家要实现和平稳定,多数公民必须信守这些基本原则,并形成“契约共同体”共守之。
一个宪政国家的标准流程是:(1)公民通过自由辩论、交流、协商,根据某种多数决方式选出代表自己的立法者(主要是议会);(2)议会根据多数主义程序制定至少代表多数人利益的立法;(3)议会立法经由政治中立的行政获得忠实和有效执行;(4)如果行政执法违法侵犯了公民权利和利益,那么既可以通过议会监督也可以通过法院裁判加以监督;(5)在少数情况下,如果议会立法侵犯了公民的宪法权利,法院也可以审查并撤销立法,以防“多数人的暴政”。
以此衡量,美国已不是标准的宪政民主国家。事实上,就连它的法治秩序都已被打破,以上流程的第三、四点已经大打折扣。特朗普派出马斯克和“六小将”为首的“文革小组”,接管了白宫的关键部门,以清除“深层国家”腐败为名扣押资金、解雇人员并停止执行国会通过的立法。法院临时中止了某些“文革”措施,但身为最高行政首脑的总统和专门领导执法的司法部长竟口出狂言,拒绝执行法院判决。上一次发生这样的事情还是1832年,杰克逊(Andrew Jackson)总统宣称:(首席大法官)约翰马歇尔已经作出判决,现在让他自己去执行吧!如果说司法判决不能自执行,国会监督也靠不住,因为共和党议员已占据了国会两院多数,对行政分支发生的无法无天听之任之。民主党议员再怎么抗议,也孤掌难鸣。
然而,最根本的问题还是出在选民身上。他们因为对民主党执政这样或那样的不满——有些不满的理由是真实和正当的,而选择了一位种族主义和独裁倾向已经在第一个任期内显露无遗的总统。如果没有基督教民族主义的铁杆支持,如果美国社会的种族与性别偏见可以更少一点,如果更多的选民能够信任职业操守总体上可靠的主流媒体(不论左右,包括Fox新闻),而不是社交媒体上泛滥的阴谋论,那么特朗普本来不会上台。(见“美国契约”现状考察之一:族群态度及其政治影响;之二:基督教民族主义的政治影响;之三:社交媒体的时代挑战)
换言之,美国国内乃至整个世界陷入困局,根源在于“美国契约”破裂了——相当一部分选民放弃了政治自然法的前三条,成了政教合一、种族主义和阴谋论的支持者。虽然美国宪法还在,剩下的“契约共同体”已不足以支撑一个有效运行的宪政国家。事实上,“美国文革”进行了一个月,却没有影响特朗普支持率仍然过半,甚至仍有高达70%的美国人认为他在“履行竞选承诺”。[1]
在许多人看来,近代最古老的宪政国家沦陷似乎是不可思议的,但这种可能性今天已经清晰呈现在所有人面前。有一个真实的著名笑话,也叫“哥德尔漏洞”:1938年纳粹吞并奥地利之后,数理逻辑天才哥德尔逃亡美国,他以证明“不完备性定理”闻名。1947年,他在准备公民身份测试时发现,美国宪法存在漏洞。后来爱因斯坦陪他去法院参加面试,负责考试的法官问他奥地利是什么政体。他回答说:“原来是共和政体,但宪法最终被改为独裁政体了。”这位联邦上诉法院的法官骄傲地对他说:这样的事情在美国是不会发生的。哥德尔回答:“怎么不会?不信,我可以证明给你看!”[2]其实,这是根本不需要证明的假命题:只要是由人建构并维持的政体,就没有什么“不可能”的。现在,哥德尔预言的“漏洞”已经在美国捅大了,尽管未必是以其原先预见的方式。
二、谁来决定政府的大小
民主的沦陷不是没有缘由的,通常都理所当然地起因于对民主的不满,譬如经济萧条、失业加剧、全球化带来的社会冲击、移民剧增、有色人种或少数性别群体的崛起、基督教文化和白人优势的衰落……这些不满聚集起来,结果选出了一位承诺“让人民满意”的民粹领袖。有了底层民意的支持,民粹领袖可以大刀阔斧消灭实现独裁的制度障碍,法治化的官僚体系被描绘为既得利益盘踞的“深层政府”。在美国,这个人是总统,因而他的第一刀自然是砍向自己领导的行政系统。这也正是“深层政府”的主体。
和任何国家一样,美国行政的最大特点就是“大”。无论立法还是司法,规模都不可与行政相比拟。美国国会两院才535名参众议员,加上工作人员大约3万人;联邦三级法院加起来不到900名法官,加上工作人员也是大约3万人。然而,行政部门工作人员有430万人之多,其中文职人员220万(不包括63万邮政人员)、军队210万(其中80万为预备役)。注意,军队其实没什么特别,只是任务特别的公务员而已,因为和所有公务员一样,军人的天职是忠于国家,而国家就是代表人民利益的法律。因此,无论文武,忠诚对象都是法律而非领袖。总共近500万联邦工作人员中,行政人员占超过98%。各州也差不多是这个概念,各国都大同小异。因此,我们在谈论“国家”或“政府”的时候,绝大多数时候指的就是行政。
你可以说,政府这么“臃肿”,赶紧砍啊!如果你对民主还存有任何好感的话,还是赶紧把这个话收回去。这么多部门、这么多雇员、每个部门花多少钱都不是某个领导拍拍脑袋决定的,而是投票选出来的国会每年开好几个月的会,通过立法确定下来的。从美联署到环保局到国防部,美国每一个行政部门的规模、经费和存在理由都是经过民主审议和论证的。你是谁?凭什么砍?你也许会说,马斯克牛啊!你看他把私人企业做那么好,让他来砍!但马斯克自己的事做再好,他代表谁呢?只能代表他自己,代表不了美国选民。政府太大确实不好,但砍谁留谁总不能由一个没有民意基础的人来决定。
国内那么多“自由派”从来没有享受过民主的好处,总以为政府越小越好,实际上就是因为没有任何政治经验,成了无政府主义者。问题是,即便是在美国,保守派也不会同意裁减警察吧?何况“新政”已经快一个世纪,即便是相对保守的美国也不可能回到政府只做“守夜人”的时代。政府一大,就难免低效甚至腐败,但只要还没有堕入国人熟悉的那种政体,裁不裁、怎么改都是民选议会通过立法决定的事,绝不能任由一群“革命小将”胡来。
那你说,特朗普是选上来的,他不可以决定行政部门的裁员和冻结开支吗?克林顿在任期间还“协议辞退”过40万不到的行政人员呢,何况特朗普开出的条件更好。问题是,克林顿裁员是经过近一年的公开调研和征求意见,最后以国会两党绝对多数通过的。不错,总统权力确实包含了提出年度预算,总统可以“自废武功”,砍掉部门预算。但不论什么预算,都得要两院通过后才能生效。事实上,预算可以说是最重要的一种国会立法。现在特朗普当局这么大的动作,征求过谁的意见吗?即便要做也得等到两院通过新的预算立法之后啊!这种故意不执行甚至公然违背国会现有立法的行为是可以构成弹劾的,林肯的继任约翰逊(Andrew Johnson)就差点因此而被弹劾。现在只是因为共和党占了两院多数,才使弹劾在政治上不可行,可见即便在美国这样的国家,一党执政也不可能实现权力制衡。没有权力制衡,那就只能有赤裸裸的人治。
十八、十九世纪的美国法治确实不发达,政府也小,总统或党魁呼风唤雨;人事任命大行论功行赏的“分赃制”,从国务卿到清洁工,都是他拍板说了算。这样的体制任人唯亲,不仅效率低,而且很容易滋生腐败。十九世纪末期进步党改革,1883年的《彭德尔顿法案》建立了现代文官体制。其主要特点是区分政务官和事务官:前者有一定的决策权,后者就是负责执行的普通公务员。因为总统要保证团队合作,政务官的任命仍然实行“分赃制”。这是为什么特朗普可以“举贤不避亲”,任命自己的亲家为法国大使。这样的任命大概有3000多高级职位,美国比其它民主国家多得多。但和庞大的公务员队伍相比,他们仍然是九牛一毛,不足0.1%。公务员要通过考试、择优录取,职位的稳定性则受到法律保障。司法部长权力很大,但总统可以随时罢免;司法部的一名普通律师可能卑微得多,但总统看他不顺眼也不能随便开除,而是要有正当理由,而且他还可以向“文官体制保护委员会”乃至法院上诉。美国每年的行政诉讼是巨量的,其中1/3之多都是公务员的维权诉讼。
只有公务员的职务待遇享有相对独立性,才能保证行政执法公正中立。否则,公务员的饭碗掌握在上司手里,那还不是领导让你干什么就干什么?对这类现象,国内自由派应该很熟悉了。美国电影之所以还能经常上演下级挖出上级腐败黑料的故事,现实中也确实偶有其事,就是因为普通公务员的身份独立。这是美国行政法治的基石。现在特朗普要摧毁美国的行政中立体制,以便他呼风唤雨,像解雇政务官那样随意解雇公务员,像统治自己的家族那样统治美国,就是要摧毁美国法治,回到十九世纪的“分赃制”,建立只听命于自己的独裁帝国。
三、美式“文革”能走多远?
既然美国法治基础深厚、行政中立传统悠久,摧毁“深层政府”的唯一办法就是通过“文革”。“文革”的本质是最高领袖通过普通群众“砸烂公检法”,用底层来清除不听话的中上层。特朗普的办法是利用外部力量,将“马斯克木马”植入白宫。他任命的财政部长等亲信对“六小将”大开绿灯,任由他们发动“内部革命”,以“反腐”的名义接触政府机密、裁撤行政人员,甚至直接强迫职能部门关门,直到行政系统全体都变成“总统的人”。
如果这个趋势继续下去,美国法治、民主乃至自由的丧钟即将敲响。如莱维茨基教授指出,政府拥有巨大的政治资源;如果这些资源为总统一人或一党所用,它们将被用于系统性地削弱反对力量。[3]譬如我们耳熟能详的是,如果公安、检察、税务等政府部门放弃政治中立并为一党服务,那么它们都可以被用来对反对派进行选择性的“查税”、“反腐”或“环保执法”。更不用说现代政府还掌握着特许经营、行政合同、税收减免等众多经济资源,可以用来奖励同党、打击异己。如果维权成本越来越高,精英和民众都体会到“顺昌逆亡”的道理,那么美国就会加剧向人人恐惧“枪打出头鸟”的“囚徒困境”演变。敢于出来说“不”的人越来越少,也越来越徒劳,直至第一修正案成为“有宪法无宪政”的具文。
目前,美国商界出于自身利益考虑,已纷纷“跪舔”新政权。一向以借鉴和强势谈判著称的亚马逊以4000万高价,买下第一夫人重返白宫的纪录片授权。特朗普此前起诉好几家媒体“侵权”,一度不了了之,在他当选后纷纷高价“和解”。Meta曾在2021年国会大厦骚乱后暂停特朗普的账号,据说侵犯了他的“言论自由”。2024年11月,创始人小扎进入海湖庄园晚宴期间,特朗普明确表示,要和新总统“从今往后相安无事”,就必须解决这起诉讼。此后,Meta支付了2500万“和解费”。迪士尼旗下的ABC新闻也以1500万,支付了特朗普提起的“诽谤”诉讼。[4]特朗普难道不是诽谤法必须容忍的“公众人物”吗?他对煽动国会山暴乱难道没有责任吗?这些商界精英的所作所为表明,他们并不信任美国法律。在法律和权力之间,他们选择了后者。这对美国法治来说绝不是一个好兆头。
当然,有人会说,美国还有独立司法守护“公正的最后一道关口”。不错,得益于法官终身制,特朗普当局一时还改变不了美国司法的大局。但我更相信汉德法官的名言:当社会整体江河日下的时候,法官也无力回天。事实上,美国司法并非固若金汤。首先,联邦最高法院已经呈现6:3的保守派优势,在特朗普任期内有可能进一步扩大。最高法院已经给予总统在任期间的“职务行为”以绝对豁免权,无异于为他打造了违法作乱的护身符。其次,法官和其他高官一样,也是总统提名、参院任命。换言之,特朗普仍有机会任命自己的亲信以改变美国司法的构成。最后,对于坚持原则的法官,当局也可以通过“反腐”调查乃至弹劾恐吓之。弹劾法官的程序要求和弹劾总统一样,成功的难度很大,但只要通过众议院多数启动程序,也就达到了敲山震虎、杀鸡儆猴的目的。
最后的希望当然是周期性选举。如果特朗普当局的胡作非为终于出了大乱、惹了众怒,得罪了自己的支持者,那么共和党将在选票箱前付出代价。两年或四年之后,他们会成为美国人民的弃儿。但在此之前,毕竟还有许多变数。已经有“川粉”向特朗普劝进“第三任”,据说他本人也在考虑这个“可能性”。如果他连修宪都敢想,还有什么不敢想的呢?共和党一贯热衷于滥划选区(gerrymandering),这是出了名的。除了系统性压制反对力量之外,也不能排除通过改变或扭曲选举规则来维持“永久执政”这种可能。到那个时候,政治自然法的五点原则就荡然无存了,美国也就彻底堕落为一个威权政体。
四、美国的希望
我无意把美国的前景说得很暗淡,但特朗普上台不足一月的迅猛进展不能不令人警惕。孟子说得好:“生于忧患,死于安乐。”面对美国当下的危机,既不能太乐观,也不能太悲观。美国无疑是有希望的,但它不能有面试哥德尔的那位法官的盲目自信。如果大意,发生在德国的事情完全可能在美国发生,甚至以前已局部频繁发生过,只是没有蔓延到美国整体而已。在宪政民主和威权独裁这两极的“纳什平衡”中,美国已开始向另一极迅速滑坡。另一方面,它的宪政制度仍然相对完整。就和在任何国家一样,宪政民主的希望在于抗争,而美国当下的抗争机会仍足够多、成本仍足够小、反对力量仍足够强大。如果反对派被悲观情绪击倒,那后果只会是江河日下、万劫不复。
美国的“民主灯塔”确实暗淡了,但重新点亮的最大机会仍在于美国自己手里。它仍然有政治自然法的几乎全套资源——相当完整的选举制度、相当中立的行政系统、高度独立的司法、几乎不受限制的言论和新闻自由……尽管一部分选民在政教分离、族群平等、政治认知上出了问题,或因为对政治自然法原则重视不够而让一时情绪或短期利益压倒了自己的长远利益。但是在政治生态没有完全恶化之前,这些人是可以改变的。他们需要理解,没有什么救世主,也没有什么“天选之子”;公然违反宪法的不是英雄,而是罪犯;美式“文革”不会带来清廉或高效,而只会摧毁自己赖以生存的法治……
只有当这部分人开始觉醒,而觉醒者不放弃抗争,美国的“契约共同体”才能再次强大,美式“文革”闹剧才会结束,而文明世界才能迎来“民主灯塔”的回归。
[1] Anthony Salvanto et al., ‘CBS News poll — Trump has positive approval amid “energetic” opening weeks; seen as doing what he promised’, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-approval-opinion-poll-2025-2-9/.
[2] F.E. Guerra-Pujol, ‘Gödel’s Loophole’, Capital University Law Review, 41: 637-673 (2013).
[3] 史蒂文·莱维茨基、卢坎·韦:“民主的崩溃:通往美国的威权主义道路”, https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20250213A003RU00.
[4] Rebecca Ballhaus, Dana Mattioli and Annie Linskey, ‘How the Trumps Turned an Election Victory into a Cash Bonanza’,Wall Street Journal, 14 February 2025, https://www.wsj.com/politics/elections/trump-family-election-cash-bonanza-2f5f8714.
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Source:
- 张千帆,美国沦陷的政治自然法根源, FT中文网,2025年2月16日